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I. In the ongoing debate on the meaning of logical connectives1, two families of 
theories have surfaced as main contenders.2  On the one hand, representational 
semantics hold that the meaning of a logical connective is determined by its 
contribution to the truth conditions of propositions containing it. On the other hand, 
inferentialist theories (sometimes called ‘functional’ or ‘conceptual’ role semantic 
theories as well)3  claim that “the meanings of logical constants are determined by 
certain characteristic implications.”4  Most commonly, these characteristic 
implications correspond to the ‘introduction’ and ‘elimination’ rules of a natural 
deduction system. For inferentialists, therefore, the meaning of a logical connective is 
1 . There is a widespread ambiguity regarding the term ‘logical connectives’. For the purposes of this 
paper, I will use the term to make reference to constant symbols in the language of our logical calculi, 
like ‘&’, ‘v”, etc. Other authors prefer to restrict their use of the term for the meanings of such 
symbols.
2. I borrow the distinction from Robert B. Brandom Articulating Reasons. An Introduction to 
Inferentialism (Cambridge: Harvard University Press 2000) 45
3. Block (2000)
4. Gilbert Harman, ‘The Meaning of Logical Constants” Truth and Interpretation: Perspectives on the 
Philosophy of Donald Davidson, edited by Ernest Lepore (Oxford, Blackwell: 1986) 126
closely connected to its deductive calculus.5  For representationalists, on the other 
hand, a logical connective’s meaning is more intimately connected to its inter-
pretation. Traditionally, the interpretation of a formal language is taken to “establish 
the link between the formulas and what they stand for”.6  This is the reason why the 
inferential account is sometimes called ‘syntactic’, while the representational one is 
called ‘semantic’.
 The first approach originates in the work of Peirce, and is implicit in the work 
of Russell, Ramsey and others. However, it did not become of age until the seminal 
work of Tarski on the notion of ‘truth’ for artificial languages.7 The second one can be 
traced as far back as Frege’s original logical calculus, the Begriffsschrift and finds 
inspiration in Wittgenstein’s passages like the following:
The rules of logical inference cannot be either wrong or right. They 
determine the meaning of the signs.8
We can conceive the rules of inference –I want to say– as giving the signs 
5. It is important to notice that . . . “To begin with, inferential role semantics is the doctrine that 
meaning is inferential role. . . In the first instance, it is sentences, not words, that one infers from and 
to, and thus it is sentences  that have inferential roles. Nonetheless, we can think of the inferential role 
of a word as represented by the set of inferential roles of sentences in which it appears. The notion of 
the inferential role of a word (and likewise for other sub-sentential constituents) is a made-up idea, but 
this is an obvious way to make it up.” Ned Block, “Holism, Hyper-analyticity and Hyper-
compositionality” Mind & Language 8, 1, 1993. 1,2 “Let’s call the totality of the inferences to which a 
sentence is capable of contributing, its total inferential role. A sub-sentential constitutent’s total 
inferential role can then be defined accordingly, as consisting in the contribution it makes to the total 
inferential role of the sentences in which it appears. [¶] Against this rough and ready background, an 
inferential role semantics is just the view that there is some construct out of an expression’s total 
inference role that constitutes its meaning what it does. Let us call this construct an expression’s 
meaning-constituting inferential role, or MIR for short.” Paul A. Boghossian, “Does an Inferential Role 
Semantics Rest Upon a Mistake?” Mind & Language, VIII, 1 (1993) 27.
6. Jaroslav Peregrin, “Interpreting Formal Logic” Erkenntnis 40 (1994) 5
7. For a critical survey of the development of the representational account out of Tarski’s theory and  its 
relation to the inferentialist position, cf. Hartry Field “Tarski’s Theory of Truth’ The Journal of 
Philosophy, LXIX, 13 (1972) 347-375
8. Ludwif Wittgenstein, Remarks on the Foundations of Mathematics (Cambridge, MIT Press: 1956) 24
their meaning, because they are rules for the use of these signs.9
However, it  finds its cornerstone in a much-quoted passage from Gerhardt Gentzen’s 
“Investigations into Logical Deduction.” 10  Regarding the derivation rules of his 
sequent calculus, he wrote that 
The introductions represent, as it were, the “definitions” of the symbols 
concerned, and the eliminations are no more, in the final analysis, than the 
consequences of these definitions.11 
Lately, this line of thought has been pursued, in some way or another, by logicians 
and philosophers like Sellars, Gilbert Harman, Michael Dummett, Ned Block, Robert 
Brandom and Jaroslav Peregrin.
 To better understand the proposed two ways of determining the meaning of a 
logical connective, let us take ‘&’ as an example. From a representationalist point of 






This table must be read as saying that if p is true and q is true, then p&q is also true; if 
p is true and q is false, p&q is false as well; and so on.
For the inferentialist, in contrast, the meaning of this logical connective is 
determined by its introduction and elimination rules. Traditionally, these are the 
9 Ludwif Wittgenstein, Remarks on the Foundations of Mathematics (Cambridge, MIT Press: 1956) 
398
10. Cf. Francis J. Pelletier, “A Brief History of Natural Deduction” History  and Philosophy of Logic, 20 
(1999) 1-31
11. American Philosophical Quarterly, Vol. I, No.4, Octubre 1964: 295, §5.13
following:
Conjunction Introduction:
    p






   p
 p&q
-------
   q
It is a widespread opinion that, at least for truth functional connectives, both 
approaches can be easily shown to be equivalent.12  This is achieved by  defining 
logical inference (the key concept in inferentialists theories) in terms of truth 
conditions (the key concept in representational theories). Accordingly, to say  that one 
proposition logically implies another is to say that the first cannot  be true without the 
other being true. Under this definition of logical inference, introduction and 
elimination rules provide the same information about the meaning of logical 
connectives as their truth table. In the case of conjunction, for example, introduction 
and elimination rules would say that, necessarily
 (Introduction) If p and q are true, then p&q is true as well
 (Elimination) p&q is true only if both p and q are true
Taken together, they would say that p&q is true if, and only if p and q are both true, 
which is exactly what the truth table for conjunction tells us.
12. In Jaroslav Peregrin’s words, that “the usual [truth-table] meanings we ascribe to expressions [can] 
be construed as ‘disguised’ inferential roles.” Jaroslav Peregrin, “Meaning as Inferential Role” Logica 
Yearbook 2002, forthcoming.
I call this the ‘collapse argument.’ It plays an essential role in the current 
debate between inferrentialists and representationalists, regularly used on both sides 
to argue for a ‘reduction’ of one type of semantics to the other
 Gilbert Harman (1986) has shown that this argument does not work so well 
for the rest of the truth-functional connectives, as it does with conjunctions.13 
However, I want to show that even for the apparently unproblematic case of 
conjunction, the transformation from one definition to the other is not so 
straightforward either. Mostly, I want to argue that no true inferentialist should be 
convinced by the collapse argument.
II. There are different ways of rejecting the collapse argument. The first and obvious 
one would be to reject the truth-conditional definition of logical implication. I have no 
space here to pursue that line of argumentation. Instead, I will criticize the way the 
collapse argument reads the elimination and implication rules. I will sustain that, even 
before applying the truth-theoretical definition of logical implication, the collapse 
argument requires a non-inferentialist reading of the introduction and elimination 
rules, thus making it unacceptable for a true inferentialist.
Let me start by giving a brief account of what exactly is an inferentialist 
theory  of meaning, when applied to logical formalism. Inferentialists are so called, 
13. It is important to tell that the aim of Harman’s argument in (1986) is not to overcome inferentialism 
(after all, his non-solipsistic conceptual role semantics is an inferentialism), but only its commitment to 
characteristic implications expressed by inference rules. Among the ‘final remarks’ of his paper, he 
writes: “Even if the meanings of logical constants are determined by their role in inference, it is 
imprecise to say that these roles are determined by characteristic implications.” P. 134
because they  advocate a thoroughly inferential account of meaning. This dictum 
acquires special relevance when applied to the interpretation of logical formalism.14  
Now, if logical concepts are entirely fixed by their functions in reasoning, 
a concept C expresses logical conjunction if it serves to combine two 
thoughts P and Q to form a third thought C(P, Q), where the role of C can 
be characterized in terms of the principles of ‘conjunction introduction’ 
and ‘conjunction elmination’.15
For an inferentialist, therefore, logical rules and formulae must be read exclusively in 
terms of inferential operations. Inferentialists diverge on whether these inferential 
operations are determined by  psychological processes or by proof constructions. In 
the remaining of this paper I will adopt a proof-theoretical vocabulary, but nothing of 
what I will say next could not be easily expressed in psychological terms as well.
Under an inferentialist theory of meaning, therefore, logical rules must be read 
as saying something about the validity of proofs, while formulae must be interpreted 
in terms of allowed proof constructions in the calculus. A rule that says that a formula 
A follows from another formula B expresses the logical validity of any proof that has 
A among its premises and B as its conclusion.
Now, let us take a new look at the introduction and elimination rules for 
conjunction:
 (Introduction) p&q follows from p and q
 (Elimination) p and q follow from p&q
14. According to Brandom, this new “way of thinking about semantics” is also the “basis” of “a new 
way of thinking about logic” (Brandom (2000) 45). Hence, the inferentialist/representationalist 
controversy diverges into a parallel philosophical debate regarding the nature of logic: the question 
whether Logics’s central object of study is logical consequence or logical truth. Inferentialist’s 
advocacy of an inferentialist interpretation of logical formalism seems to commit them to place logical 
truth at a subordinate position in relation to logical consequence.
15. Gilbert Harman, “(Non Solipsistic) Conceptual Role Semantics” in E. Lepore (ed.) New Directions 
in Semantics (London: Academic Press, 1987) 137
So read, these rules seem to establish a kind of logical equivalence between the 
logical connective ‘&’ and the logical word ‘and’. This is one of the reasons why 
some logicians believe that the logical connective ‘&’ is synonymous or is the formal 
counterpart of logical word ‘and’ in natural language.16  However, it is important to 
notice that the word ‘and’ that occurs in the enunciation of these rules belongs to the 
meta-language of logic. Under an inferentialist perspective, this would be the 
language logicians use to talk about the construction of proofs in a formal system. To 
make this proof-theoretical dimension more obvious we may want to rephrase these 
readings more explicitly as:
 (Introduction) Any proof that includes both p and q among its premises, and 
p&q as its conclusion is logically valid.
 (Elimination) Any argument that includes p&q among its premises, and either 
p or q as its conclusion is logically valid.
Notice that by  reading the rules this way, not only the second ‘and’ (as well as 
the putative synonymy between ‘&’ and ‘and’) disappears, but also the apparent 
topical homogeneity  between both rules. On the inferentialist reading, each rule 
connects the ‘&’ connective with a different sort of proof construction. The 
introduction rule connects it with the addition of premises to an argument, while the 
elimination rule connects it with the operation of obtaining different conclusions from 
the same set of premises. Hence, according to the introduction rule, the connective 
‘&’ expresses the conjunction of premises, while the elimination rule defines the 
connective as expressing the conjunction of conclusions. From a proof-theoretical 
point of view it is clear that these two conjunctions are different.
16. Cf. Raúl Orayén Lógica, Significado y Ontología (México D.F.: UNAM/IIF, 1989) 172-174
Finally, even if we accept the truth-theoretical account of logical inference, we 
are left not with one, but two truth tables, one for each rule and logical operation. 
Under the truth-conditional definition of logical inference, the introduction rule for 
conjunction would determine the following truth table:
 p q p&q
  T T T
 T F ?
 F T ?
 F F ?
while the elimination rule would determine the following one
 p&q p q
 T T T
 F ? ?
In other words, even under a truth-conditional reading, the introduction rule does not 
tell us anything about the truth value of the conjunction as a conclusion when the 
premises are not both true. Likewise, the elimination rule does not tell us anything 
about (the truth value of) the conclusion when the conjunction as a premise is not 
true.
 The proponent of the collapse argument still needs to establish the 
correspondence between these two incomplete tables and the single and complete 
truth table proposed by representationalists. Thus, she is faced with a dilemma: either 
take one of the incomplete tables and ‘fill in the blanks’ to obtain a complete one, or 
integrate both partial truth tables into a complete one. The first horn of the dilemma 
would be accomplished, for example, by saying that the introduction and/or 
elimination rule for the connective establishes both the necessary and sufficient 
conditions for the validity of certain proofs. However, this approach seems to have the 
inconvenience of reading these inference rules as establishing logical equivalence, 
instead of logical inference. Hence, it would seem logically inadmissible. However, 
some version of it has been recently advocated by  M. E. Kalderon (2001) and J. 
Peregrin (forthcoming).17
 Peregrin argues for what he calls an Exhaustive Assumption (EA) when 
translating inference rules into truth tables:
If we manage to turn all the rows ending with T into inferential conditions, 
we can complete the specification by  stimulating minimality: “any  other 
statement fulfilling all the conditions must be inferable from O(S1, . . . Sn)
In other words, for Peregrin, the information provided by the truth table is not 
contained in any of the introduction or elimination rules, but in the fact that they  are 
the introduction and the elimination rules for the aforementioned connective. In 
consequence, introduction rules must be read under the minimality18  assumption that 
the inferences they  determine are the only way to introduce the connective. 
Elimination rules, conversely, must also be read under the minimality assumption that 
the inferences they determine are the only  ones that  allow for the elimination of the 
connective.
 In the case of conjunction, this would mean that  the introduction rule 
establishes the only pattern of inference available for the introduction of the 
17. I say ‘some version of it’, because they do not use this strategy to join the information from the 
elimination and introduction rules or to complete the truth table of conjunction. They do not consider 
this strategy to be necessary in the case of conjunction.
18. Peregrin’s exhaustivity assumption includes  a maximality principle as well, for completing partial 
truth tables that include only lines finishing in ‘F’. I find his account of those cases as extremely 
problematic, but at least does not apply to conjunction, so is out of the scope of this paper.
conjunction symbol. In other words, that no other combination of p and q would entail 
p&q. This way, Peregrin can complete the truth table obtained from the introduction 
rule as follows:
 p q p&q
  T T T
 T F F
 F T F
 F F F
However, this strategy does not work as nicely for the elimination rule. 
On the other hand, taking the second horn of the dilemma would require a 
philosophical account that brings together both logical operations under a single 
notion of conjunction. However, we have no logical or philosophical reason to say 
that joining different premises together in an argument is the same (or inverse) 
operation than obtaining different conclusions from the same argument.
 In either case, the main hurdle to overcome would be to give a philosophical 
account of the ambiguity emerging from the inferentialist  account. One must explain 
how two apparently different logical constructions (adding new premises and 
obtaining new conclusions) may determine one single logical concept (conjunction). 
This may be accomplished by explaining either which one of the two aforementioned 
conjunctions is the logical conjunction, or how both operations of conjunction form a 
single logical unity. However, it is clear that such account does not yet exist, and that 
the issue has not been properly raised in the current debate. Consequently, it is correct 
to say  that there is no straightforward reconciliation for the inferentialist and 
representationist theories of meaning for logical connectives.
III. Finally, however, one may still wonder why would we need to conciliate both 
approaches after all. There is still the alternative of proposing a two-factor theory of 
meaning for logical connectives. On this vision, the meaning of a logical connective is 
a composite of two sorts of semantic contents: its conceptual content, determined 
inferentially, and its representational content, determined by its truth table.
On this view, meaning consist of an internal, “narrow” aspect of 
meaning . . . and an external referential/truth-theoretic aspect of 
meaning . . .19
 Besides the usual problems burdening two-factor theories of meanings,20 this 
strategy is specially difficult  to maintain in the case logical connectives, because 
logical terms have traditionally been defined precisely as those elements of language 
whose meaning is entirely  inferential. As such, they  are supposed to have no 
representational role besides that relevant for inference and logical implication. A 
representational account of meaning, in the case of logical terms, cannot go beyond 
establishing its inferential role. Logical terms differ from other non-logical terms in 
their having only  conceptual content. This was the original definition of Frege in his 
Begriffsschrift (1879), and survives in current logical orthodoxy. The relevant passage 
from Frege reads as follows:
There are two ways in which the content of two judgements may differ; it 
may, or it  may not, be the case that all inferences that can be drawn from 
the first judgement when combined with certain other ones can always 
also be drawn from the second when combined with certain other ones can 
19. Ned Block, “Conceptual Role Semantics” in Edward Craig (ed.) The Routledge Encyclopedia of 
Philosophy (London: Routledge, 2000)
20. For a summary account of the difficulties of two-factor semantics, see Block (2000)
always also be drawn from the second when combined with the same 
other judgements. The two propositions ‘the Greeks defeated the Persians 
at Plataca’ and ‘the Persians were defeated by  the Greeks at  Plataca’ differ 
in the former way; even if a slight difference of sense is discernible, the 
agreement in sense is preponderant. Now I call that part of the content that 
is the same in both the conceptual content. Only  this has significance for 
our symbolic language [Begriffsschrift] . . . In my formalized language 
[Begriffsschrift] . . . only that part of judgements which affects the 
possible inferences is taken into consideration. Whatever is needed for a 
correct inference is fully expressed; what is not needed is . . . not. (Frege 
1879 §3)
This conception was the original motivation behind inferentialism, and admiting a 
two-tier theory of meaning would go directly  against it. Hence, it is inconsistent with 
the inferentialist position to hold a two-tier account of meaning, at least for logical 
connectives.
 In the end, the inferentialist must bite the bullet and reject the 
representationalist’s truth-functional story both as an equivalent and/or as a 
supplementary account of the meaning of logical connectives.
APPENDIX: What the Collapse Argument is not.
The collapse argument is not an argument for the reduction of the inferrential content 
of a connective to its non-referrential.
In other words, truth tables themselves can be read both inferrentially and 
representationally. For representationalists, each line of the truth table establishes the 
truth-conditions of a complex sentence in terms of the truth conditions of its 
components sentences. For inferrentialist, a truth table keeps expressing inferrential 
connections, and each line must be read as establishing a valid inference form the 
turth or falsity  of the component sentences to the truth or falsity of the component 
statement. In the case of conjunction notice that when we say that p&q is true only if 
p and q are both true, we are using both the conjunction and implication notions as 
marked by the occurrence of the so-called logical words “and” and “only  if”. In other 
words, truth tables cannot be interpreted as defining the meaning of logical 
connectives in non-inferrential terms.
 Furthermore, this jump from direct inferences (from p and q to p&q) to truth-
conditional inferences (from the truth of p and the truth of q to the truth of p&q) has 
its (very high) price. If it is not p&q which follows from p and q, but the truth of 
p&q which follows from the truth of p and the truth of q, 
 Hence, instead of three patterns of inference, the truth table establishes four 
patterns of inference: 
    p is true
    q is true
 --------------
 p&q is true
    p is true
    q is false
 --------------
 p&q is false
    p is false
    q is true
 --------------
 p&q is false
    p is false
    q is false
 --------------
 p&q is false
However, if these four basic patterns of inference establish the meaning of the 
connective, then we must then read them as 
   It is true that p is true
   It is true that q is true
 ------------------------------
 It is true that p&q is true
   It is true that p is true
   It is false that q is true
 ------------------------------
 It is true that p&q is true
   It is false that p is true
   It is true that q is true
 ------------------------------
 It is true that p&q is true
   It is false that p is true
   It is false that q is true
 ------------------------------
 It is true that p&q is true
and
   It is true that p is true
   It is true that q is false
 ------------------------------
 It is true that p&q is false
   It is true that p is true
   It is false that q is false
 ------------------------------
 It is false that p&q is false
   It is false that p is true
   It is true that q is false
 ------------------------------
 It is false that p&q is false
   It is false that p is true
   It is false that q is false
 ------------------------------
 It is false that p&q is false
then what happens when p or q are not actually  true. In the direct inferrentialist case, 
it is still possible for p&q to follow from p and q, even when one of them is false. 
However, in the truth table case, those lines in the table which contradict reality must 
be read subjunctively. Hence, they  would have to say that  if p and q were true, p&q 
would also be true.
